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Abstract
We consider a Bayesian game, namely the Battle of the Sexes with private information, in which
each player has two types, High and Low. We allow cheap talk regarding playerstypes before the
game. We prove that the unique fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium exists (for a low
range of prior probability of the High-type) and has a desirable type-coordination property: it fully
coordinates on the ex-post e¢ cient pure Nash equilibrium when the playerstypes are di¤erent.
Type-coordination is also obtained in a partially revealing equilibrium in which only the High-type
is not truthful, for a medium range of prior probability of the High-type. We also prove that there
is no (non-babbling) truthful cheap talk equilibrium if only one player talks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Following the seminal paper by Crawford and Sobel (1982), much of the cheap talk literature has
focused on the sender-receiver framework whereby one player has private information but takes no
action and the other player is uninformed but is responsible for taking a payo¤-relevant decision.
There indeed is a small but growing literature on games where both players have private information
and can send cheap talk messages to each other.1 Our aim in this paper is to contribute to this
literature by analysing symmetric cheap talk equilibria in a game with two-sided information and
two-sided cheap talk.
We analyse a version of the Battle of the Sexes with two-sided private information using unmediated,
cheap-talk. The complete information BoS has many economic applications (see the Introduction in
Cabrales et al 2000); the corresponding game of incomplete information is not just a natural extension
but is also relevant in many of these economic situations where the intensity of preference and its
prior probability are important factors. BoS type games may be more complicated with incomplete
information, where each player has private information about the intensity of preference for the
other players favorite outcome. Apart from its applications, the BoS with private information is
clearly of interest to theorists and experimentalists. It is not obvious at all whether truthful revelation
and thereby separation of playerstypes can be achieved in a cheap talk equilibrium for the BoS with
private information; moreover, it is also not clear whether coordination using cheap talk, as in the
theoretical and the experimental literature with the complete information BoS,2 would extend to the
BoS with private information.
To analyse the above two issues, namely truthful revelation and coordination, we use the simplest
possible version of the BoS, as in Banks and Calvert (1992), with two types (Highand Low) for
each player regarding the payo¤ from the other players favorite outcome. The structure of the game
we consider here has an in-built tension for each player between the desire to compromise in order
to avoid miscoordination and the desire to force coordination on ones preferred Nash equilibrium
1Examples of information transmission using two-sided cheap talk under two-sided incomplete information can be
found in Farrell and Gibbons (1989), Matthews and Postlewaite (1989), Baliga and Morris (2002), Doraszelski et al
(2003), Baliga and Sjöström (2004), Chen (2009), Goltsman and Pavlov (2014) and Horner et al (2015). Two-sided
cheap talk using multiple stages of communication where only one of the players has incomplete information has also
been studied by Aumann and Hart (2003) and Krishna and Morgan (2004).
2 In a seminal paper, Farrell (1987) showed that rounds of cheap talk regarding the intended choice of play reduces
the probability of miscoordination; the probability of coordination on one of the two pure Nash equilibria increases
with the number of rounds of communication (although, at the limit, may be bounded away from 1). Park (2002)
identied conditions for achieving e¢ ciency and coordination in a similar game with three players. Parallel to the theory,
the experimental literature also shows that cheap-talk and any pre-play non-binding communication can signicantly
improve coordination in games like BoS (Cooper et al 1989; Crawford 1998; Costa-Gomes 2002; Camerer 2003; Burton
et al 2005).
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outcome. This contrasts with the Hawk-Dove game studied in Baliga and Sjöström (2012) and the
Cournot game in Goltsman and Pavlov (2014) where a players preference over the other players
action does not depend on his type or action. The question we ask is whether, in this game, players
will (fully or partially) reveal their types in a direct cheap talk equilibrium and also coordinate on
Nash equilibrium outcomes in di¤erent states of the world. With incomplete information, e¢ ciency
and coordination do not necessarily go together; however, one might nd it desirable to coordinate on
the (ex-post) e¢ cient outcome when the two players are of di¤erent types, in which the compromise is
made by the player who su¤ers a smaller loss in utility. In the game we consider here, it is not apriori
clear at all whether either full information revelation or the desirable coordination can be achieved in
equilibrium.
The primary focus of Banks and Calvert (1992) was to study communication in a similar game us-
ing an impartial mediator and the e¢ ciency implications of such mediated communication. Although
incentive compatible mediated mechanisms (as in Banks and Calvert, 1992) inform us about all achiev-
able possibilities with strategic communication, it might be impractical to conceive of or employ an
impartial mediator in a real-world situation. For instance, in a market entry game (as in Dixit and
Shapiro, 1985) or in the adoption of product compatibility standards (as in Farrell and Saloner 1988), it
is not clear how a mechanism involving an impartial mediator can be implemented. However, we know
that rms talk to each other and/or make public announcements from time to time. We believe that
direct cheap talk communication among players might occur more naturally in a strategic situation
and this is the motivation for studying cheap talk equilibria in this paper.
Banks and Calvert (1992) also studied unmediated communication in a similar game allowing more
general message spaces (i.e., not restricted to only two types) in the communication phase. Banks
and Calvert identied conditions (Proposition 2, Section 4 in their paper) under which the outcome
of an ex-ante e¢ cient incentive compatible mediated mechanism can be achieved as the equilibrium
of an unmediated communication process. In contrast, the focus of our current paper is to identify
conditions under which (full) revelation occurs at the cheap talk stage and some form of coordination
property holds. Obviously, these objectives are di¤erent from those studied in Banks and Calvert
(1992). Ganguly and Ray (2009) have analysed this game to see if a truthful cheap talk equilibrium,
in which the players reveal their types truthfully before playing, exists at all3 and compared it with
the mediated equilibrium of Banks and Calvert (1992).
The main contributions of this paper are thus two-fold. We rst prove that there exists a unique
fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium of this game in which the players announce their types
truthfully (Theorem 1).4 Theorem 1 also suggests that full revelation is not a cheap talk equilibrium
3We actually correct their result in this paper.
4Considering symmetric communication processes seems reasonable here; since the players are identical, facing an
3
when the probability of a player being High-type is too high or too low; the allowable range of the
prior probability of the High-type for the fully revealing equilibrium to exist in Theorem 1 has to be
moderately low with the upper bound being strictly less than 12 . Secondly, we note that our unique
fully revealing cheap talk equilibrium has the desirable type-coordination property : when the players
types are di¤erent, it fully coordinates on the ex-post e¢ cient pure Nash equilibrium.
We then consider partially revealing equilibria particularly for situations when the fully revealing
equilibrium does not exist. Keeping the spirit of the fully revealing equilibrium, we characterise a
class of partially revealing cheap talk equilibria in which only the High-type is not truthful, while the
Low-type is truthful. We analyse this particular type of partial revelation because in the fully revealing
equilibrium, the High-type is expected to compromise and coordinate on his less preferred outcome
when the other player claims to be of Low-type. We identify the unique partially revealing cheap talk
equilibrium with the type-coordination property in this set of equilibria5 and prove its existence based
on the prior probability of the High-type being within a range that turns out to be non-overlapping
and higher than that for the fully revealing equilibrium (Theorem 2). We illustrate all these results
using a numerical example.
We also consider the scenario when only one of the players is allowed to talk in our game, to
understand the di¤erence between one-sided and two-sided cheap talk. We nd (Theorem 3) that
one sided truthfulness is not possible in any meaningful equilibrium, that is, there is no non-babbling
equilibrium followed by truthful cheap talk by one player only.
Finally, we also consider non-canonical message spaces at the cheap-talk stage; we identify a new
equilibrium with a bigger message space (including the types) and nd (Theorem 4) that, with the
help of more messages, truthfulness and the desirable coordination together may be achieved even
when the direct truthful cheap talk equilibrium does not exist.
2 MODEL
2.1 The Game
We consider a version of the BoS with incomplete information as given below, in which each of the two
players has a set of strategies Si containing two pure strategies, namely, A and B, i.e., Si = fA;Bg,
i = 1; 2. Let S = S1  S2 denote the set of strategy combinations of the two players. The payo¤s are
as in the following table, in which the value of ti 2 Ti is the private information of player i, i = 1; 2,
identical symmetric situation ex-ante, we study (type and player) symmetric cheap talk equilibria, following the tradition
in the literature (as in Farrell 1987 and Banks and Calvert 1992).
5We also characterise the complete set of partially revealing cheap talk equilibria in which only the High-type is not
truthful while the Low-type is truthful (Proposition 2 in this paper).
4
with 0 < ti < 1. We assume that ti is a discrete random variable that takes only two values L and H,
where, 0 < L < H < 1, whose realisation is only observed by player i. So, Ti = fL;Hg, i = 1; 2. For
i = 1; 2, we henceforth refer to the values of ti as player is type (Low, High). We further assume that
each players type is independently drawn from the set fL;Hg according to a probability distribution
with Prob(ti = H) = p (H) = p 2 [0; 1]. Also, the payo¤s to both players from the miscoordinated
outcome is normalised to 0, while the payo¤ to player 1 (player 2) from (A;A) ((B;B)) is normalised
to 1.
Player 2
A B
Player 1 A 1; t2 0; 0
B 0; 0 t1; 1
These payo¤s will also formally be denoted by the playersutility functions ui : STi ! R; i = 1; 2.
Note that player is utility depends here on own type ti only and not on the other players private
information tj .
The unique symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium6 of this game7 can be characterised by i(si jti ),
the probability that player i of type ti plays the pure strategy si.
Proposition 1 The unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the BoS with incomplete infor-
mation is given by the following strategy for player 1 (player 2s strategy is symmetric and is given by
1(A jt ) = 2(B jt ), t = H;L):
1(A jH ) = 0 and 1(A jL ) = 1(1 p)(1+L) when p < L1+L ,
1(A jH ) = 0 and 1(A jL ) = 1 when L1+L  p  H1+H ,
1(A jH ) = 1  Hp(1+H) and 1(A jL ) = 1 when p > H1+H .
The proof is straightforward and hence has been omitted here.
2.2 Cheap Talk
We study an extended game in which the players are rst allowed to have a round of simultaneous
canonical cheap talk intending to reveal their private information before they play the above BoS. In
the rst (cheap talk) stage of this extended game, each player i simultaneously chooses a costless and
nonbinding announcement  i from the set Ti = fL;Hg. Then, given a pair of announcements (1; 2),
6The corresponding game with complete information with commonly known values t1 and t2, has two pure Nash
equilibria, (A;A) and (B;B), and a mixed Nash equilibrium in which player 1 plays A with probability 1
1+t2
and player
2 plays B with probability 1
1+t1
.
7 In a similar game, Banks and Calvert (1992) also provided a similar characterisation.
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in the second (action) stage of this extended game, each player i simultaneously chooses an action si
from the set Si.
An announcement strategy in the rst stage for player i is a function ai : Ti ! (Ti), where (Ti)
is the set of probability distributions over Ti . We write ai(H jti ) for the probability that strategy
ai(ti) of player i with type ti assigns to the announcement H. Thus, the announcement  i of player
i with type ti is a random variable drawn from Ti according to the probability distribution with
Prob( i = H) = ai(H jti ).
Beliefs for player i are given by epi : Tj ! (Ti); i; j = 1; 2: We will denote is posterior belief byepi(H j j ) = Prob(tj = H j j ).
In the second (action) stage, a strategy for player i is a function i : Ti  T1  T2 ! (Si), where
(Si) is the set of probability distributions over Si . We write i(A jti; 1; 2 ) for the probability that
strategy i(ti; 1; 2) of player i with type ti assigns to the action A when the rst stage announcements
are (1; 2). Thus, player i with type tis action choice si is a random variable drawn from fA;Bg
according to a probability distribution with Prob(si = A) = i(A jti; 1; 2 ). Given a pair of realised
action choices (s1; s2) 2 S1  S2 , the corresponding outcome is generated. Thus, given a strategy
prole ((a1; 1); (a2; 2)), one can nd the playersactual payo¤s from the induced outcomes in the
type-specic payo¤ matrix of the BoS and hence, the (ex-ante) expected payo¤s. As the game is
symmetric, in our analysis, we maintain the following notion of symmetry in the strategies, for the
rest of the paper.
Denition 1 A strategy prole ((a1; 1); (a2; 2)) is called announcement-symmetric (in the announce-
ment stage) if ai(H jti ) = a i(H jti ); a strategy prole is called action-symmetric (in the action stage)
if i(A jt; 1; 2 ) =  i(B jt; 2; 1 ), for all t; 1; 2. A strategy prole is called symmetric if it is both
announcement-symmetric and action-symmetric.
Note that Denition 1 preserves symmetry for both players and the types for each player. We
consider the following standard notion of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE)8 in this two-stage cheap
talk game.
Denition 2 A symmetric strategy prole ((a1; 1); (a2; 2)) together with beliefs ( ep1; ep2) is called a
symmetric cheap talk equilibrium if it is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the game with cheap
talk, i.e., each player is playing optimally at all his information sets given the strategy of the other
player and the beliefs are updated according to the Bayes rule whenever possible.
Formally, ((a1; 1); (a2; 2)) and ( ep1; ep2) is a PBE of the game with cheap talk if
8Our denition follows the standard formulation of PBE in the literature (see for example, Fudenberg and Tirole
1991 and Baliga and Morris 2002).
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(1) 8ti;8i 6= j; i; j = 1; 2
ai( i jti ) > 0 =)
 i 2 arg max
 0i2Ti
P
tj
p (tj)
P
j
aj( j jtj )
P
s2S
[i(si jti;  0i;  j )j(sj jtj ;  0i;  j )]ui (s; ti)
(2) 8ti;  i;  j ;8i 6= j; i; j = 1; 2
i(si jti;  i;  j ) > 0 =)
si 2 arg max
s0i2Si
P epi(tj j j ) P
sj2Sj
j(sj jtj ;  0i;  j )ui (s0i; sj ; ti)
(3) 8i 6= j; i; j = 1; 2epi(tj j j ) = aj(j jtj )p(tj)P
t0
j
2Tj
aj(jjt0j )p(t0j) if
P
t0j2Tj
aj( j
t0j )p  t0j > 0
and epi(: j j ) is any probability distribution on Ti if P
t0j2Tj
aj( j
t0j )p  t0j = 0:
In Denition 2 above, Condition (1) ensures optimality at the cheap talk stage. For example,
if the announcement strategy ai(: jti ) is completely mixed, then condition (1) implies that both the
messages ( i = H and  i = L) should provide the same expected payo¤ to player i with type ti.
If ai(: jti ) is a pure strategy, then condition (1) will yield a weak inequality whereby the expected
payo¤ from the chosen pure strategy announcement and then following the equilibrium strategy at
the action stage is at least as high as the expected payo¤ from choosing the other message and
subsequently using the optimal strategy at the action stage (which could possibly be a deviation from
the prescribed equilibrium prole). Similarly, Condition (2) ensures optimality at the action stage
whereby a completely mixed action strategy yields an equality constraint for expected payo¤s (using
suitable posterior beliefs) and a pure strategy yields an inequality constraint. Finally, Condition (3)
ensures that posterior beliefs are derived using Bayes rule.
Denition 2 suggests that a symmetric cheap talk equilibrium can be characterised by a set of
(symmetric) equilibrium constraints (2 for the announcement stage and another possible 8 for the
action stage).
3 MAIN RESULTS
The main purpose of our paper is to nd, if exists, an equilibrium with truthful talk. We thus
rst consider the possibility of full revelation of the types as a result of our canonical cheap talk.
Subsequently, we present and analyse some other cheap talk equilibria in this section.
3.1 Fully Revealing Equilibrium
We consider a specic class of strategies in this subsection where we impose the property that the
cheap talk announcement should be fully revealing.
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Denition 3 A symmetric strategy prole ((a1; 1); (a2; 2)) is called fully revealing if the announce-
ment strategy ai reveals the true types with certainty, i.e., ai(H jH ) = 1 and ai(H jL ) = 0.
We now characterise the fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium. We rst consider a spe-
cic fully revealing (separating) strategy prole that we call Sseparating, inuenced by the equilibrium
action prole in Farrell (1987) for the complete information version of this game. In this strategy
prole, the players announce their types truthfully and then in the action stage, they play the mixed
Nash equilibrium strategies of the complete information BoS when both playerstypes are identical
and they play (B;B) ((A;A)), when only player 1s type is H (L).
We state our rst result below.9
Theorem 1 Sseparating is the unique fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium and it exists
only for L
2+L2H
1+L+L2+L2H  p  LH+LH
2
1+L+LH+LH2 .
Before proving Theorem 1, we rst observe the following fact that follows from Denitions 2 and
3.
In a fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium ((a1; 1); (a2; 2)), the playersstrategies in
the action phase must constitute a (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium of the corresponding complete
information BoS, that is, (1(t1; t2); 2(t1; t2)) is a (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium of the BoS
with values t1 and t2, 8t1; t2 2 fH;Lg. Thus, in a fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium
((a1; 1); (a2; 2)), conditional on the announcement prole (H;H) or (L;L), the strategy prole in the
action phase must be the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the corresponding complete information
BoS, that is, whenever t1 = t2, (1(t1; t2); 2(t1; t2)) is the mixed Nash equilibrium of the BoS with
values t1 = t2.
Based on the above fact, one can easily identify all the candidate equilibrium strategy proles of the
extended game that are fully revealing and symmetric. It implies that these proles are di¤erentiated
only by the actions played when t1 6= t2, that is, when the playerstypes are (H;L) and (L;H).
The proof of Theorem 1 may now be completed easily; we have postponed the details of the rest
of the proof to the Appendix of this paper.
The following couple of claims illustrate some features of the equilibrium Sseparating. The claims
are easy to establish and hence we have omitted the formal proofs for them.
Claim 1 The ex-ante expected payo¤ for any player from Sseparating is given by EUseparating =
p2 H1+H + p(1  p)(1 +H) + (1  p)2 L1+L , which is increasing over the range of p where it exists.
Claim 2 The upper bound for p in Theorem 1, LH+LH
2
1+L+LH+LH2 is always <
1
2 , since
1
2  HL+H
2L
1+L+HL+H2L =
(1+L LH LH2)
2(1+L+HL+H2L) > 0, as long as L < H < 1.
9Theorem 1 in this paper corrects and thus improves upon the main result presented in Ganguly and Ray (2009).
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To understand why p must lie in such a low range for this equilibrium to exist (as stated in
Theorem 1 and Claim 2), consider the incentives for deviations by player 1 at the announcement stage.
By deviating and claiming to be an L-type, player 1(H-type) gains 1  H1+H = 11+H when player 2 is
a H-type (with probability p) and loses10 H   H1+L = HL1+L when player 2 is a L-type (with probability
1   p). Since 11+H   HL1+L = (1+L LH LH
2)
(1+H)(1+L) > 0 , the gain from the deviation when playing against
player 2(H-type) is bigger than the loss when playing against player 2(L-type). If a H-type is equally
or more likely than a L-type, then player 1(H-type) will obviously deviate and truthful revelation will
not be an equilibrium. So, p must be < 12 . Indeed, p needs to be small enough to make the above
deviation unattractive and the precise value of p for which this holds is HL+H
2L
1+L+HL+H2L or less. However,
p cannot be too close to 0 either. This is because of incentives for deviations by player 1(L-type). By
deviating and claiming to be an H-type, player 1(L-type) gains L   L1+L = L
2
1+L when player 2 is a
L-type (with probability 1  p) and loses 1  H1+H = 11+H when player 2 is a H-type (with probability
p). Since 11+H   L
2
1+L =
(1+L HL2 L2)
(1+H)(1+L) > 0 , the loss from the deviation when playing against player
2(H-type) is bigger than the gain when playing against player 2(L-type). The expected gain will
outweigh the expected loss only if a L-type is much more likely than a H-type (and L is bigger than
0). Hence, player 1(L-type) would deviate at the cheap talk stage only if p is too close to 0.
3.2 Partially Revealing Equilibrium
The fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium exists only for a moderately low range of the
prior probability p. One may now ask what sort of equilibria, if any, exists for any given p outside this
range. Understandably, it is not easy to characterise all possible equilibria for this game.
In this subsection, we aim to characterise a specic class of partially revealing symmetric equilibria
of the above cheap talk game. As noted earlier, in the fully revealing equilibrium, the H-type is
expected to compromise and coordinate on his less preferred outcome when the other player claims to
be of L-type. We thus nd it natural to analyse the type of partial revelation in which only the L-type
truthfully reveals while the H-type does not.
Formally, we consider a symmetric announcement strategy prole in which the H-type of player i
announces H with probability r and L with probability (1  r) and the L-type of player i announces
L with probability 1, i.e., ai(H jH ) = r and ai(H jL ) = 0. Clearly, after the cheap talk phase, the
possible message proles (1; 2) that the H-type of player 1 may receive are (H;H), (H;L), (L;H)
or (L;L) while the L-type of player 1 may receive either (L;H) or (L;L).
Let us denote an action-strategy of player 1 by 1(A jH;H;H ) = q0, 1(A jH;H;L ) = q1,
1(A jH;L;H ) = q2, 1(A jH;L;L ) = q3, 1(A jL;L;H ) = q4 and 1(A jL;L;L ) = q5. By sym-
10Note that after deviating in the cheap talk stage, player 1 (H-type) may deviate at the action stage as well. In fact,
the optimal deviation strategy for player 1 (H-type) is to play action B when player 2 is a L-type.
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metry, a partially revealing symmetric strategy prole ((a1; 1); (a2; 2)) in our set-up can thus be
identied by (r; q0; q1; q2; q3; q4; q5).
First note that, on receiving the message prole (H;H), the players know the true types and hence
in any such partially revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium, q0 has to correspond to the mixed
Nash equilibrium of the complete information BoS with values H and H. Thus, q0 = 11+H .
One may indeed characterise the whole set of partially revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibria
in this set up (in which only the L-type is truthful), by characterising the equilibrium values of
(r; q1; q2; q3; q4; q5), using the following equilibrium conditions.
If q1; q2; q3; q4 and q5 correspond to completely mixed strategies in the action stage, then we must
have the following ve conditions for player 1 to be indi¤erent between playing A and B (where the
LHS in each equation is the expected payo¤ from A and the RHS in each equation is the expected
payo¤ from B):
Player 1(H-type) receiving the message prole (L;H):
1  q1 = q1H, (1)
Player 1(H-type) receiving the message prole (H;L):
(
p  rp
1  rp ) (1  q2) + (1 
p  rp
1  rp ) (1  q4) = (
p  rp
1  rp )q2H + (1 
p  rp
1  rp )q4H, (2)
Player 1(H-type) receiving the message prole (L;L):
(
p  rp
1  rp ) (1  q3) + (1 
p  rp
1  rp ) (1  q5) = (
p  rp
1  rp )q3H + (1 
p  rp
1  rp )q5H, (3)
Player 1(L-type) receiving the message prole (L;L):
(
p  rp
1  rp ) (1  q3) + (1 
p  rp
1  rp ) (1  q5) = (
p  rp
1  rp )q3L+ (1 
p  rp
1  rp )q5L, (4)
Player 1(L-type) receiving the message prole (L;H):
1  q1 = q1L. (5)
Also, in the cheap talk phase, player 1(H-type), who is using a completely mixed strategy, should be
indi¤erent between announcing H and L, which implies
(1  p) (q1 (1  q4) + (1  q1) q4H) + p(r H
1 +H
+ (1  r) (q1 (1  q2) + (1  q1) q2H))
= p (r (q2 (1  q1) + (1  q2) q1H) + (1  r) (q3 (1  q3) + (1  q3) q3H))
+ (1  p) (q3 (1  q5) + (1  q3) q5H) . (6)
where the LHS of (6) is the expected payo¤ from announcing H and the RHS is the expected payo¤
from announcing L.
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Finally, in the cheap talk phase, it should be incentive compatible for player 1(L-type) to announce
L, which implies
(1  p) (q5 (1  q5) (1 + L)) + p (r (q4 (1  q1) + (1  q4)q1L) + (1  r) (q5 (1  q3) + (1  q5)q3L))
 Max
x
(1  p) (x (1  q4) + (1  x) q4L) + p(r H
1 +H
+ (1  r) (x (1  q2) + (1  x) q2L)) (7)
The LHS of (7) is the expected payo¤ from announcing L and following the equilibrium strategy
thereafter while the RHS is the expected payo¤ from deviating and announcing H and then choosing
the optimal strategy in the action phase given the deviation in the cheap talk phase. So, x is the
optimal probability of playing A in the action phase after player 1(L-type) deviates and announces H
and receives the message prole (H;L). Note that the RHS of this last inequality constraint (7) allows
player 1(L-type) to deviate in both stages of the game and hence, (7) checks the players incentives
against the best possible deviation.
By virtue of symmetry, the equilibrium conditions for player 2 are identical to the above. Using
these equilibrium conditions, one can prove that certain proles as listed in the proposition below
constitute this equilibrium set.
Proposition 2 The following proles are the only partially revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibria
in which only the L-type is truthful:
(i) q1 = 11+H , q2 = q3 =
p+Hp rp H
p+Hp rp Hrp , q4 = q5 = 1 with any 0 < r  1   H(1 p)p ; exists when
p > H1+H ,
(ii) q1 = 0, q2 = 1, q3 = 0, q4 = 1, q5 = 11+L+LH+LH2 p Lp LHp LH2p and r =
LH+LH2
p+Lp+LHp+LH2p ;
exists when LH+LH
2
1+L+LH+LH2 < p <
L+LH+LH2
1+L+LH+LH2 ,
(iii) q1 = 0, q2 = 1, q3 =
p+Hp+H2p+H3p H H2 H3
p+Hp+H2p+H3p H2 H3 , q4 = q5 = 1 and r =
H2
p+H2p ; exists when
p > H+H
2+H3
1+H+H2+H3 ,
(iv) q1 = 0, q2 = 1, q3 = 0, q4 = 1, q5 = 1 and r = H+H
2
1+H+H2 ; exists when
L+LH+LH2
1+L+LH+LH2 < p <
H+H2+H3
1+H+H2+H3 ,
(v) q1 = 11+H , q2 = q3 = 0, q4 = q5 = 1 and r =
p+Hp H
p ; exists when
H
1+H < p < 1.
We are not presenting the details of the proof of Proposition 2 which can be found in a previous
discussion paper version of our work (Ganguly and Ray 2013).
3.3 Coordination
One may note that Sseparating features a specic form of coordination in which the players play (B;B)
((A;A)) when only player 1s type is H (L), that is, when the playerstypes are di¤erent, players fully
coordinate on a pure Nash equilibrium outcome that generate the ex-post e¢ cient payo¤s of 1 and H.
We call this property type-coordination.
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Denition 4 A strategy prole is said to have the type-coordination property if the induced outcome
is (A;A) and (B;B), when the playerstrue type prole is (L;H) and (H;L), respectively.
Clearly, the type-coordination property can be achieved in other kinds of equilibria. Indeed, the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game without the cheap talk (as mentioned in Proposition 1) also
satises type-coordination property when the prior p is between L1+L and
H
1+H (for example, between
1
4 and
2
5 for the parameters L =
1
3 , H =
2
3 ).
Although the type-coordination property can be obtained in the fully revealing cheap talk equilib-
rium or in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, one might still ask whether it is possible to obtain type-
coordination where players do not reveal their types truthfully. This motivates us to check whether
at all type-coordination can be obtained in any of the partially revealing equilibria, as described in
Proposition 2.
In a partially revealing equilibrium in which only the L-type truthfully reveals while the H-type
does not, following Proposition 2, note that for the type-coordination property to hold, we need
proles satisfying q1 = 0, q3 = 0 and q5 = 1. Using symmetry, for player 2(H-type), we then must
have 2(A jH;L;H ) = 1   q1 = 1. This implies that in any such prole, q2 = 1 and q4 = 1. Thus,
a candidate partially revealing equilibrium prole with the type-coordination property must have
q0 =
1
1+H , q1 = 0, q2 = 1, q3 = 0, q4 = 1 and q5 = 1.
We now state our second main result. The proof has been postponed to the Appendix.
Theorem 2 In a partially revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium, in which only the L-type is
truthful, that satises the type-coordination property, r must be H+H
2
1+H+H2 ; this equilibrium exists only
when L+LH+LH
2
1+L+LH+LH2 < p <
H+H2+H3
1+H+H2+H3 .
Note that the prole in Theorem 2 above is the same as that given in (iv) in Proposition 2. Let
the equilibrium prole stated in Theorem 2 be called Spooling.
To understand why p must lie within such a range for Spooling to be an equilibrium (as stated in
Theorem 2), consider the incentives for deviations by player 1 at the action stage. According to the
above strategy prole, on receiving the message prole (L;L), player 1(H-type) needs to play B. Given
that player 2(H-type) plays A and player 2(L-type) plays B, player 1(H-type) will indeed play B only
if he believes that player 2 is more likely to be an L-type than an H-type. This means that player
1(H-type)s posterior belief about player 2 being an H-type should not be too high. If we denote this
posterior belief by p0, then p0 = P (ti = H j i = L ) = p rp1 rp . Since this posterior p0 is an increasing
function of the prior p ( @@p (
p rp
1 rp ) =
(1 r)
(1 rp)2 > 0), the constraint that p0 should not be too high implies
that the prior p cannot be very high either.11 Hence, there is an upper bound for p that is strictly less
11 If p were to be equal to 1, i.e., player 2 were certainly an H-type, player 1(H-type) would then denitely have
preferred playing A, not B.
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than 1. Similarly, according to the above strategy prole, after receiving the message prole (L;L),
player 1(L-type) needs to play A. Again, given that player 2(H-type) plays A and player 2(L-type)
plays B, player 1(L-type) will play A only if the posterior p0 is not too small which explains the lower
bound on p.
The following couple of claims illustrate some features of the equilibrium Spooling. These two claims
are easy to establish and hence we have omitted the formal proofs for them.
Claim 3 The ex-ante expected payo¤ for any player from the equilibrium Spooling is given by EUpooling =
p(1+H)(1+H+H2 p H2p)
1+H+H2 .
Claim 4 The upper bound of the range for p in Theorem 2 does not involve L, is increasing in H and
is bounded by 34 .
3.4 One-sided Talk
One-sided cheap talk with two-sided private information has also been studied in the literature (see, for
example, Seidmann (1990) and more recently, Moreno de Barreda (2012)). One thus may be interested
to know whether the properties of truthfulness and type-coordination of the two-sided cheap talk
equilibria can be achieved with one-sided cheap talk in our game, when only one player (say, player 1)
talks.
To do so, we assume that player 1 chooses a costless and nonbinding announcement 1 from the
set T1 = fL;Hg.We now write i(A jti; 1 ) for the probability that strategy i(ti; 1) of player i with
type ti assigns to the action A when the rst stage announcement by player 1 is 1.
We rst consider below two specic strategy proles which we believe are closest to the two equi-
librium strategy proles studied earlier with two-sided cheap talk and we show that these strategy
proles are no longer equilibrium proles.
The rst strategy prole we analyse concerns the situation where player 1 reveals his information
truthfully. Consider the following strategy prole: in the cheap talk stage, player 1 reports his type
truthfully, i.e., a1(H jH ) = 1 and a1(H jL ) = 0; in the action stage, player 1s strategy consists of any
0  1(A jH;H )  1 and 0  1(A jL;L )  1 and player 2s strategy is given by 2(A jH;H ) = H1+H ,
2(A jH;L ) = 1, 2(A jL;H ) = 0 and 2(A jL;L ) = L1+L . Call this strategy Sonesidedseparating. It is easy to
prove that Sonesidedseparating is not an equilibrium in the game with one-sided cheap talk where only player 1
talks. To see this note that, in the action stage, player 1(H-type)s expected payo¤ from playing A is
p H1+H whereas his expected payo¤ from playing B is p
H
1+H + (1  p)H; hence, 1(A jH;H ) = 0. But
this implies that player 2(H-type) should play the pure strategy B after player 1(H-type) talks, i.e.,
2(A jH;H ) = 0; therefore, Sonesidedseparating cannot be an equilibrium.
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The second strategy prole concerns the situation where player 1(H-type) partially reveals his
information, while player 1(L-type) announces L truthfully. Formally, consider the following strategy
prole: in the cheap talk stage, player 1 reveals his type partially, i.e., a1(H jH ) = r and a1(H jL ) = 0;
in the action stage, player 1s strategy consists of any 0  1(A jH;H )  1; 0  1(A jH;L )  1
and 0  1(A jL;L )  1 and player 2s strategy is given by 2(A jH;H ) = H1+H , 2(A jH;L ) = 1,
2(A jL;H ) = 0, 2(A jL;L ) = L1+L . Call this strategy Sonesidedpooling . Following the same logic as in the
case of Sonesidedseparating, one can also show that S
onesided
pooling is not an equilibrium.
We are now going to show a more general result, namely, that any strategy prole involving truthful
revelation in the cheap talk stage does not lead to any meaningful equilibrium. To show this, we thus
focus our attention only on equilibria where at least some of the actions in the second stage depend
on the announcement from the rst stage in a non-trivial manner.
Denition 5 A strategy prole in the game with one-sided cheap talk (by player 1) is called non-
babbling if at least one of the following holds:
(i) 1(A jH;H ) 6= 1(A jL;L )
(ii) 2(A jH;H ) 6= 2(A jH;L )
(iii) 2(A jL;H ) 6= 2(A jL;L )
The following theorem conrms that truthfully revealed messages followed by actions that depend
meaningfully on the messages are no longer equilibrium proles when only one player (player 1) talks.
Theorem 3 With one-sided cheap talk where only player 1 talks, there does not exist an equilibrium
with a non-babbling strategy prole where player 1 reports his type truthfully in the cheap talk stage,
i.e., a1(H jH ) = 1 and a1(H jL ) = 0.
The proof of Theorem 3 has been postponed to the Appendix.
4 FURTHER REMARKS
We comment on several issues related to our results below.
4.1 Numerical Illustrations
Here we illustrate our main results in this paper by a specic numerical example. Let us consider the
following version of our game in which the payo¤ of the H-type of player 1 from (B;B) is 23 , twice
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that of the L-type as described in the following table.
A B A B A B A B
A 1; 23 0; 0 A 1;
1
3 0; 0 A 1;
2
3 0; 0 A 1;
1
3 0; 0
B 0; 0 23 ; 1 B 0; 0
2
3 ; 1 B 0; 0
1
3 ; 1 B 0; 0
1
3 ; 1
Types: HH Types: HL Types: LH Types: LL
Also, take the (independent) prior probability of the H-type, Prob(ti = 23 ) to be
1
5 . Then, the
unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this specic Bayesian game is given by the following
symmetric strategy prole: player 1 plays A with probability 1516 when the type is Low and plays the
pure strategy B when the type is High (player 2s strategy is symmetric and is B with probability 1516
when the type is Low and A when the type is High) which generates the following distribution over
the outcomes for di¤erent type proles (states of the world).
A B A B A B A B
A 0 0 A 0 0 A 1516 0 A
15
256
225
256
B 1 0 B 116
15
16 B
1
16 0 B
1
256
15
256
Types: HH Types: HL Types: LH Types: LL
From the above distribution over outcomes, one may observe that the unique Bayesian Nash equi-
librium for this specic game involves fair amount of miscoordination.
From Theorem 1, for these parameter values (L = 13 and H =
2
3 ), we know that the range of the
prior p for which Sseparating exists is 541 (' 0:12)  p  523 (' 0:22). For example, when p = 523 , one
may check that the payo¤ from Sseparating is 241529 (' 0:46) and that Sseparating generates the following
distribution over the outcomes.
A B A B A B A B
A 625
9
25 A 0 0 A 1 0 A
3
16
9
16
B 425
6
25 B 0 1 B 0 0 B
1
16
3
16
Types: HH Types: HL Types: LH Types: LL
Following Theorem 2, Spooling for these parameter values exists for p between 1946 (' 0:41) and
38
65 (' 0:58); in Spooling, the L-type is truthful but the H-type partially reveals his true type with
probability 1019 (' 0:53). When p = 3865 , the payo¤ from such an equilibrium also turns out to be
15
38
65 (' 0:58). The corresponding equilibrium distribution over the outcomes is as follows.
A B A B A B A B
A 141361
36
361 A 0 0 A 1 0 A 0 1
B 97361
141
361 B 0 1 B 0 0 B 0 0
Types: HH Types: HL Types: LH Types: LL
Note that although the above equilibrium achieves type-coordination, in this case, there is a com-
plete miscoordination in the LL state.
4.2 Comparing Cheap-Talk and Bayesian-Nash Equilibria
Our cheap talk equilibria, Sseparating and Spooling both satisfy the type-coordination property. Note
that for a xed value of H and L, the lower bound for p for Spooling to exist is bigger than the upper
bound for p for Sseparating to exist. Thus, these two di¤erent equilibria with the type-coordination
property exist for distinct values of p. For L+LH+LH
2
1+L+LH+LH2 < p <
H+H2+H3
1+H+H2+H3 , when Spooling exists as
an equilibrium, Sseparating is not an equilibrium because the H-type does not want to truthfully reveal
his information. Allowing the H-type to reveal his information partially in the cheap talk stage helps
sustain the partially revealing equilibrium. As noted earlier, it is possible to achieve type-coordination
in the unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the BoS (without the cheap talk stage) itself
when L1+L  p  H1+H (see Proposition 1).
It is also conceivable that for some parameter values of L and H (such as, L = 0:2, H = 0:9), the
ranges of p where Sseparating and Spooling respectively exist, do separately overlap with the interval
[ L1+L ;
H
1+H ]. Hence, there exist possible values of p for which both Sseparating and the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium achieve type-coordination (such as, p = 0:2 for the parameter values L = 0:2, H = 0:9)
and similarly, values of p for which both Spooling and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium achieve type-
coordination (such as, p = 0:4 for the parameter values L = 0:2, H = 0:9). However, when L1+L 
p  H1+H , the structure of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is such that the players fully miscoordinate
when their true type prole is (H;H) or (L;L). This contrasts with Sseparating where the players
achieve some degree of coordination in both the states (H;H) and (L;L), and with Spooling where
the players manage to coordinate with positive probability when the state is (H;H) although there is
complete miscoordination when the true type prole is (L;L). Hence, both EUseparating and EUpooling
are strictly greater than that of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, conrming that cheap talk is strictly
benecial to both players.
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4.3 Comparison with Mediated Equilibria
Banks and Calvert (1992) characterised the (ex-ante) e¢ cient symmetric incentive compatible di-
rect mechanism for a similar game so that the players are truthful and obedient to the mechanism
(mediator). Following Banks and Calvert (1992), one may analyse (as in Ganguly and Ray 2009)
a (direct) symmetric mediated equilibrium that provides the players with incentives (i) to truthfully
reveal their types to the mediator and (ii) to follow the mediators recommendations following their
type-announcements. Clearly, our cheap talk equilibria can be achieved as outcomes of such medi-
ated equilibria using incentive compatible mechanisms. Formally, one can easily prove that (i) the
distribution over the outcomes generated by Sseparating can be achieved as a symmetric mediated
equilibrium if L
2+2L2H+L2H2
1+L+H+LH2+L2+L2H+L2H2+H2  p  H L+LH
2+L2H+L2H2+H2
1+L+H+LH2+L2+L2H+L2H2+H2 and (ii) the distri-
bution over the outcomes generated by Spooling can be achieved as a symmetric mediated equilibrium if
L+LH+LH2
1+L+LH2+H2  p  H+H
2+H3
1+H+H2+H3 . Not surprisingly, these ranges of p strictly contain the corresponding
ranges for the cheap talk equilibria implying a larger range of p for which the corresponding mechanism
is in equilibrium. Rather intuitively, this indicates that there are priors for which an outcome can be
obtained as an equilibrium via a direct mechanism but not using the unmediated one-round cheap talk
that only allows direct communication between players of di¤erent types.
4.4 Cheap Talk with More Messages
Finally, we consider the implications of the players using a richer message space. So far, the only
messages that the players were allowed to use at the announcement stage were their own types, i.e.
Ti = fL;Hg. If instead, we allow the players to use more messages at the cheap talk stage, will
that lead to new distinct equilibria that either have higher expected payo¤s compared to the previous
equilibria and/or that exist for values of p where the previous equilibria do not exist? We explore this
interesting question by modifying our model and expanding the message space of each player.
Let each player i now choose an announcement  0i from the set T 0i = fL;Hg  fX;Y g. We modify
the strategies accordingly. An announcement strategy in the rst stage for player i is a function ai :
Ti ! (T 0i ), where (T 0i ) is the set of probability distributions over T 0i . So, for example, ai(HX jti )
stands for the probability that strategy ai(ti) of player i with type ti assigns to the announcement HX.
Beliefs for player i are now based on the new expanded message spaces. In the second (action) stage,
a strategy for player i is a function i : Ti  T 01  T 02 ! (Si), where (Si) is the set of probability
distributions over Si.
We again restrict our attention to symmetric strategy proles. The denition of a symmetric cheap
talk equilibrium is similar to Denition 2 with the message spaces appropriately adjusted.
We consider a specic class of strategies where we impose the property that the cheap talk an-
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nouncement should be fully revealing about their types. We modify Denition 3 in the following
manner.
Denition 6 A symmetric strategy prole ((a1; 1); (a2; 2)) is called fully revealing if the announce-
ment strategy ai reveals the true types with certainty, i.e., ai(HX jH )+ai(HY jH ) = 1 and ai(HX jL ) =
ai(HY jL ) = 0.
We consider a symmetric fully revealing announcement strategy prole in which the H-type of
player i announces HX with probability r1 and HY with probability (1  r1) and the L-type of player
i announces LX with probability r2 and LY with probability (1   r2), i.e., ai(HX jH ) = r1 and
ai(LX jL ) = r2. After the cheap talk phase, the possible message proles ( 01;  02) that the H-type
of player 1 may receive are (HX;HX), (HX;HY ), (HY;HX), (HY;HY ), (HX;LX), (HX;LY ),
(HY;LX), (HY;LY ), while the L-type of player 1 may receive (LX;HX), (LX;HY ), (LY;HX),
(LY;HY ), (LX;LX), (LX;LY ), (LY;LX), (LY;LY ).
We now look at equilibria using such message proles. The aim in studying such equilibria clearly
should be to improve upon Sseparating, the unique fully revealing symmetric equilibrium that was
obtained with fewer messages (described in subsection 3:1), in which the players play the mixed
strategy equilibria in the action stage when their types coincide, resulting in miscoordination and
low payo¤s. Using more messages may now help the players improve their coordination even when
their types are the same.
In the new candidate equilibrium prole with more messages, we thus would like to keep the
desirable type-coordination property when the types are di¤erent; for the type-coordination prop-
erty to hold, we therefore restrict our attention to action-strategies where 1(A jH;HX;LX ) =
1(A jH;HX;LY ) = 1(A jH;HY;LX ) = 1(A jH;HY;LY ) = 0:This implies, again by symmetry,
that 1(A jL;LX;HX ) = 1(A jL;LX;HY ) = 1(A jL;LY;HX ) = 1(A jL;LY;HY ) = 1:
However, note that in such an equilibrium if the messages are identical, then we are bound to have
the mixed strategy equilibria in the action stage; to be an equilibrium, in the second (action) stage, by
symmetry, an action-strategy of player 1 must have: 1(A jH;HX;HX ) = 1(A jH;HY;HY ) = 11+H ,
1(A jL;LX;LX ) = 1(A jL;LY;LY ) = 11+L .
It is worth noting that the above partial specication of part of the players strategies mimics
Sseparating. Let the class of strategy proles satisfying the above partial specication be denoted by
S0separating.
The following result shows that new and distinct equilibria emerge by virtue of the richer message
spaces used by the players.
Theorem 4 Within the class of strategy proles described by S0separating, the following four proles
constitute fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibria:
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(i) 1(A jH;HX;HY ) = 1(A jL;LX;LY ) = 0, r1 = H21+H2 , r2 = L
2
1+L2 ;
(ii) 1(A jH;HX;HY ) = 1(A jL;LX;LY ) = 1, r1 = 11+H2 , r2 = 11+L2 ;
(iii) 1(A jH;HX;HY ) = 0, 1(A jL;LX;LY ) = 1, r1 = H21+H2 , r2 = 11+L2 ;
(iv) 1(A jH;HX;HY ) = 1, 1(A jL;LX;LY ) = 0, r1 = 11+H2 , r2 = L
2
1+L2 .
All of the above equilibria exist when
L4(1+H+H2+H3)
1+L+L2+L3+L4+HL4+H2L4+H3L4  p 
HL3(1+H+H2+H3)
1+L+L2+L3+HL3+H2L3+H3L3+H4L3 .
Note that in each of the four proles in Theorem 4, players are able to coordinate in the action
stage on one of the pure equilibrium outcomes of the BoS, even when their types are the same by using
di¤erent messages (X or Y ).
In the Appendix, we provide the proof of (i). The other three cases are very similar and the proofs
are therefore omitted.
We now compare the upper and lower bounds for p for the above equilibrium (S0separating) and that
of Sseparating.
Note that
HL3(1+H+H2+H3)
1+L+L2+L3+HL3+H2L3+H3L3+H4L3  L
2+L2H
1+L+L2+L2H
=
L2(H+1)(L+1)(H3L+HL L2 1)
(1+L+L2+L3+HL3+H2L3+H3L3+H4L3)(1+L+L2+L2H) < 0,
because H3L+HL  L2   1 < L+ L  L2   1 =   (1  L)2 < 0.
This shows that the two intervals of p for the two equilibria (Sseparating and S0separating) to exist are
non-overlapping and the range for p for S0separating is strictly lower than the range for p for Sseparating.
Theorem 4 establishes that enriching the message space enables fully revealing equilibria to exist for
values of p that were not possible otherwise.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analysed a simple 2 x 2 x 2 Bayesian game and studied the possibility of informa-
tion revelation and desirable coordination using one round of direct cheap talk. The main takeaway of
our paper is that the desirable type-coordination is achieved at the unique fully revealing equilibrium
(when it exists) moreover, such a coordination may also be achievable with partial revelation when
fully revealing cheap talk equilibrium does not exist.
We here have characterised the unique fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium in the BoS
with private information. There are of course many fully revealing but asymmetric cheap talk equilibria
of this game. Clearly, babbling equilibria exist in which the players ignore the communication and just
play one of the Nash equilibria of the complete information BoS for all type-proles. There are other
asymmetric equilibria as well, as Ganguly and Ray (2009) have already shown.
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We are aware of many interesting open questions that come out of our analysis. For example, one
may ask whether non-babbling cheap talk equilibrium always exist in our game for any given p or not.
We also do not characterise the general case where neither type reveals truthfully in the cheap talk
phase. Finally, following Banks and Calvert (1992), one may also be interested in characterising the
ex ante e¢ cient cheap talk equilibrium in our set up. We postpone all these issues for future research.
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6 APPENDIX
We collect the proofs of our results in this section.
Proof of Theorem 1. As the strategies are symmetric, it is su¢ cient to characterise these
candidate proles only by 1 [A jH;L ]. There are only three possible candidates for 1 [A jH;L ] as the
complete information BoS with values H and L has three (two pure and one mixed) Nash equilibria.
These proles are (i) 1 [A jH;L ] = 1(HL) where 1(HL) is the probability of playing A in the mixed
Nash equilibrium strategy of player 1 of the complete information BoS with values t1 = H and t2 = L,
that we call Sm; (ii) 1 [A jH;L ] = 1, that we call Sineff and (iii) 1 [A jH;L ] = 0, which indeed is
Sseparating.
We rst show that Sm is not an equilibrium. Under Sm, H-type will announce his type truthfully
only if p( H1+H ) + (1   p)( H1+H )  p( H1+L ) + (1   p)( H1+L ), where the LHS is the expected payo¤ from
truthfully announcing H and the RHS is the expected payo¤ from announcing L and choosing the
corresponding optimal action strategy. This inequality implies 11+H  11+L which can never be satised
as H > L.
The second candidate strategy prole, Sineff is an equilibrium only when 1+H1+L+HL2+L2  p and
p  1+L+HL H21+L+HL+H2L . To see this, note that under Sineff , H-type will announce his type truthfully
only if p( H1+H ) + (1  p)  pH + (1  p)( H1+L ) which implies p  1+L+HL H
2
1+L+HL+H2L . Similarly, L-type will
announce his type truthfully only if pL+(1 p)( L1+L )  p( H1+H )+(1 p) which implies 1+H1+L+HL2+L2  p.
However, it can be shown that 1+H1+L+HL2+L2 >
1+L+HL H2
1+L+HL+H2L . Hence, Sineff cannot be an equilibrium.
Finally, we prove that Sseparating is an equilibrium only when HL
2+L2
1+L+HL2+L2  p  HL+H
2L
1+L+HL+H2L .
Under Sseparating, H-type will announce his type truthfully only if p( H1+H ) + (1   p)H  p + (1  
p)( H1+L ) which implies p  HL+H
2L
1+L+HL+H2L . Similarly, L-type will announce his type truthfully only if
p+ (1  p)( L1+L )  p( H1+H ) + (1  p)L which implies HL
2+L2
1+L+HL2+L2  p. 
Proof of Theorem 2. For the strategy prole given in Theorem 2 (denoted by Spooling) to be an
equilibrium, we rst need to check that q1 = 0, q2 = 1, q3 = 0, q4 = 1 and q5 = 1 are indeed consistent
with the equilibrium conditions mentioned in the paper (in Section 3:2).
We rst note that in the cheap talk phase, player 1(H-type) needs to be indi¤erent between
announcing H and L. With the given values of q0 = 11+H , q1 = 0, q2 = 1, q3 = 0, q4 = 1 and q5 = 1,
the expected payo¤ from announcing H is H (1  p)+p

H (1  r) +H rH+1

while the expected payo¤
from announcing L is pr +H (1  p) which will be equal when r = H+H21+H+H2 .
Now, we observe the following:
if player 1(H-type) receives the message prole (H;L), then the expected payo¤ from playing A
(= 0) is less than the expected payo¤ from playing B (= H), implying q1 = 0;
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if player 1(H-type) receives the message prole (L;H), then the expected payo¤ from playing A
(= 1) is greater than the expected payo¤ from playing B (= 0), implying q2 = 1;
if player 1(H-type) receives the message prole (L;L), then the expected payo¤ from playing A
(= p rp1 rp ) is less than the expected payo¤ from playing B ((1  p rp1 rp )H), implying q3 = 0, only when
p < H+H
2+H3
1+H+H2+H3 , using r =
H+H2
1+H+H2 ;
if player 1(L-type) receives the message prole (L;H), then the expected payo¤ from playing A
(= 1) is greater than the expected payo¤ from playing B (= 0), implying q4 = 1;
if player 1(L-type) receives the message prole (L;L), then the expected payo¤ from playing A
(= p rp1 rp ) is greater than the expected payo¤ from playing B ((1   p rp1 rp )L), implying q5 = 1, only
when L+LH+LH
2
1+L+LH+LH2 < p, using r =
H+H2
1+H+H2 .
Finally, in the cheap talk phase, it should be incentive compatible for player 1(L-type) to an-
nounce L. Using the inequality constraint (7), this requires p  Max
x
(1  p) ((1  x)L) + p(r H1+H +
(1  r) ((1  x)L)), where x is the optimal probability of playing A in the action phase if player 1(L-
type) deviates and announces H and receives the message prole (H;L). Again, note that the RHS of
this last inequality constraint allows player 1(L-type) to deviate in both stages of the game. The deriva-
tive of the RHS of this inequality with respect to x is L (p  1)+Lp( H+H21+H+H2 1) < 0, which implies x =
0 and in turn shows that this condition is satised (LHS = p  RHS = (L+LH+LH
2+H2p LHp LH2p)
1+H+H2 )
only when p  L+LH+LH21+H+LH+LH2 . Since H+H
2+H3
1+H+H2+H3   L+LH+LH
2
1+L+LH+LH2 > 0, the above gives us a meaningful
range for p.
Hence, the prole constitutes an equilibrium if L+LH+LH
2
1+L+LH+LH2 < p <
H+H2+H3
1+H+H2+H3 . 
Proof of Theorem 3. Let us rst denote the action stage strategies by 1(A jH;H ) = s1,
1(A jL;L ) = s2, 2(A jH;H ) = s3, 2(A jH;L ) = s4, 2(A jL;H ) = s5, 2(A jL;L ) = s6. We divide
all potential action strategy proles into the following subcategories and prove that none of these can
be an equilibrium.
Case (i): Both s1 and s2 are pure strategies
If s1 = s2, then this would imply that s3 = s4 = s5 = s6. This would then be a babbling strategy
prole.
If s1 6= s2, then it must be that s1 = s3 = s5 and s2 = s4 = s6. It is easy to check that in the
rst stage, one of the types for player 1 will deviate. For example, if s1 = 1 and s2 = 0, then player 1
(L-type) will want to announce that he is a H-type.
Case (ii): Both s1 and s2 are completely mixed strategies
For player 1(H-type) to be indi¤erent between playing A and B (where the LHS of the equation
is the expected payo¤ from A and the RHS of the equation is the expected payo¤ from B), we must
have:
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ps3 + (1  p) s5 = p (1  s3)H + (1  p) (1  s5)H (8)
For player 1(L-type) to be indi¤erent between playing A and B, we must have:
ps4 + (1  p) s6 = p (1  s4)L+ (1  p) (1  s6)L (9)
Also, in the cheap talk phase, it should be incentive compatible for player 1(H-type) to announce
H, which implies
p [s1s3 + (1  s1) (1  s3)H] + (1  p) [s1s5 + (1  s1) (1  s5)H]
 Max
s
p [ss4 + (1  s) (1  s4)H] + (1  p) [ss6 + (1  s) (1  s6)H] (10)
where s is the optimal probability of playing A in the action phase if player 1(H-type) deviates
and announces L.
Using (8), the LHS of (10) = p (1  s3)H+(1  p) (1  s5)H. Note that the derivative of the RHS
of (10) with respect to s is ps4 + (1  p) s6   p (1  s4)H   (1  p) (1  s6)H < 0, which implies that
s = 0. So, the RHS of (10) = p (1  s4)H + (1  p) (1  s6)H.
(10) =) p (1  s3)+(1  p) (1  s5)  p (1  s4)+(1  p) (1  s6) which implies that p (1  s3)H+
(1  p) (1  s5)H > p (1  s4)L+ (1  p) (1  s6)L and ps3 + (1  p) s5  ps4 + (1  p) s6:
This contradicts (8) and (9).
Case (iii): s1 is a completely mixed strategy and s2 is a pure strategy
If s2 = 1, then s4 = s6 = 1:
Then(10) =) ps3 + (1  p) s5  1 which can be satised only if s3 = s5 = 1 but that would mean
that s1 = 1 which is a contradiction.
If s2 = 0, then s4 = s6 = 0:
Then(10) =) p (1  s3)H + (1  p) (1  s5)H  H which can be satised only if s3 = s5 = 0 but
that would mean that s1 = 0 which is a contradiction.
Case (iv): s1 is a pure strategy and s2 is a completely mixed strategy
In the cheap talk phase, it should be incentive compatible for player 1(L-type) to announce L,
which implies
p [s2s4 + (1  s2) (1  s4)L] + (1  p) [s2s6 + (1  s2) (1  s6)L]
 Max
s
p [ss3 + (1  s) (1  s3)L] + (1  p) [ss5 + (1  s) (1  s5)L] (11)
If s1 = 1, then s3 = s5 = 1:
Using (9), the LHS of (11) = p (1  s4)L + (1  p) (1  s6)L. Then(11) =) ps4 + (1  p) s6  1
which can be satised only if s4 = s6 = 1 but that would mean that s2 = 1 which is a contradiction.
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If s1 = 0, then s3 = s5 = 0:
Then(11) =) p (1  s4)L + (1  p) (1  s6)L  L which can be satised only if s4 = s6 = 0 but
that would mean that s2 = 0 which is a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 4. For (i) to be an equilibrium, in the cheap talk phase, player 1(H-type)
needs to be indi¤erent between announcing HX and HY . The expected payo¤ from announc-
ing HX is p

r1
H
1+H + (1  r1)H

+ (1  p)H while the expected payo¤ from announcing HY is
p

r1 + (1  r1) H1+H

+ (1  p)H which will be equal when r1 = H21+H2 .
Similarly, player 1(L-type) needs to be indi¤erent between announcing LX and LY . The ex-
pected payo¤ from announcing LX is p+ (1  p)

r2
L
1+L + (1  r2)L

while the expected payo¤ from
announcing LY is p+ (1  p)

r2 + (1  r2) L1+L

which will be equal when r2 = L
2
1+L2 .
For player 1(H-type), the expected payo¤ from announcing HX must be greater than or equal to
the expected payo¤ from announcing LX, which implies
p

H2
H2 + 1

H
1 +H

+

1  H
2
H2 + 1

H

+ (1  p)H
 p+ (1  p)

L2
L2 + 1

H
1 + L

+

1  L
2
L2 + 1

H

(12)
This will be satised if p  HL
3(1+H+H2+H3)
1+L+L2+L3+HL3+H2L3+H3L3+H4L3 .
For player 1(H-type), the expected payo¤ from announcing HX must also be greater than or equal
to the expected payo¤ from announcing LY , which implies
p

H2
H2 + 1

H
1 +H

+

1  H
2
H2 + 1

H

+ (1  p)H
 p+ (1  p)

L2
L2 + 1

(1) +

1  L
2
L2 + 1

H
1 + L

(13)
Note that

L2
L2+1

H
1+L

+

1  L2L2+1

H

 

L2
L2+1

(1) +

1  L2L2+1

H
1+L

= LH LL2+1 > 0.
So, if the constraint (12) is satised, then this constraint (13) will also be satised.
For player 1(L-type), the expected payo¤ from announcing LX must be greater than or equal to
the expected payo¤ from announcing HY , which implies
p+ (1  p)

L2
L2 + 1

L
1 + L

+

1  L
2
L2 + 1

L

 p

H2
H2 + 1

(1) +

1  H
2
H2 + 1

H
1 +H

+ (1  p)L (14)
This will be satised if p  L
4(1+H+H2+H3)
1+L+L2+L3+L4+HL4+H2L4+H3L4 .
24
For player 1(L-type), the expected payo¤ from announcing LX must be greater than or equal to
the expected payo¤ from announcing HX, which implies
p+ (1  p)

L2
L2 + 1

L
1 + L

+

1  L
2
L2 + 1

L

 p

H2
H2 + 1

H
1 +H

+

1  H
2
H2 + 1

L

+ (1  p)L (15)
Note that

H2
H2+1

H
1+H

+

1  H2H2+1

L

 

H2
H2+1

(1) +

1  H2H2+1

H
1+H

=   H LH2+1 <
0. So, if the constraint (14) is satised, then this constraint (15) will also be satised.
This implies that the strategy prole given by (i) is an equilibrium if
L4(1+H+H2+H3)
1+L+L2+L3+L4+HL4+H2L4+H3L4  p 
HL3(1+H+H2+H3)
1+L+L2+L3+HL3+H2L3+H3L3+H4L3 .
Finally, note that
HL3(1+H+H2+H3)
1+L+L2+L3+HL3+H2L3+H3L3+H4L3  
L4(1+H+H2+H3)
1+L+L2+L3+L4+HL4+H2L4+H3L4
=
L3(H L)(1+H+H2+H3)(1+L+L2+L3)
(1+L+L2+L3+HL3+H2L3+H3L3+H4L3)(1+L+L2+L3+L4+HL4+H2L4+H3L4) > 0
So, this gives us a legitimate interval for p: 
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